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The governance of the Court"of Arbitration for SPort
Jean-LouP ChaPPelet
lntroduction
The idea for settine up a courr of Arbitration for sport (cAS) 
was first ptlt forward in the
-- 
.rr-ly 19t30s by Keba Mtaye, chen the IOC 'rember 
fo' S"""g"l and a juclge at the Interrtatio'al
court of Justice ar The'tr*. (rhe UN's main 
judicial organ). Mbaye's proposal was made
in r-esponse ro Internarionlbry*pi. coffImiffee (IOC) Pr-esidentJuan 
furtomo samaranch's
desire ro creare â way of settiing sporting disputes that 
would be quicker and cheaper th11 eoins
through natio*al civil courts. À, *.1i as bei'g considered slorv, expensive' 
and unfamfiar with
theparticularitiesof.,p"tt,'nttransnadonalnâtureoftpt"t":-i1t-:hatnationalcourtswere
often inappropriate places for resolving sporting clisputes 
as partres would cypically belong to
cli{ferenr jr-rrisdictions. Mbaye's solution *t, ,o ,Ë' u1i a system of arbitration' 
an interuationally
recognized techniqr-re that was already being used iJ otirtt transnational 
domains' most notably
international rrade, to adjuclicate disiutes b"r*..,t parties belonging 
to different jurisdictions'
Acting on Mbaye,s pJ;;;, tn. tOC agr-eecl on Â. ,r"r.rr", for CAS 
rn 1'983, allowing the
court to begin operations in 1984 with Mbaye as its first president' 
In fact' the creation of cAS
could not have been rnore timely for the olympic and Sports lllovement' 
which was beconring
alarmeci by the increasing te'dency for dissatisûed partiei 
(particularly athleces) to challenge the
legaiiry of irs rules and clËcisions. For exatnple, th. y.r* precechng the 
creation of the cAS had
seen rulings by two *"r, f"a*"tons lfooiball, Dot,-M"'t"to case 
in 1'976; cycling' 'Walrave
and Koch case in 1974) overturnecl by the European court ofJustice. 
(forneerly the court of
Justice of the Etrr.cpe",' Co,'*'.,*ties and,,o* 
kl-,o-,' as the Cotrrt ofJtrstice of the European
Union)andaTarwaneseloCmerrrberhadûledalawsuitagainsttheloCinaLausannecourt
(location of the IOC} heaclquarters) in L979-
In the thr-ee-and-a-ha1f decades since its foundation, the 
cAS has becorne a key institution
for ensuring ,rr. i.rr.griÇ and ,egul"tion ofthe world's sporr organizarions 
and the olyrnpic
movement(Chappelet,201'6,p.54).Ithasbeenrecognizeclasatruearbitrationtribunalby
the supreme co..,rr, of toth S*itzerland anci Gerrnrnylsee later), 
and has been designatecl the
highestboayor.pp""tbymostinternationalspor.tfederations(IF$,irrcludingthelFsforall
olympic ancl many aspiring olympic sports,_the Ioc, the International 
Paralyrnpic cofirrnit-
tee (Ipc), the worlcl Ànri-Ëoplog Agency (WADA, since 2003), 
the Féclération Internationale
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cie Football Association (FIFA, since 2002). the Intelnational Association of Athietics Federa-
tions (IAAII since 2001), and the lJnion of Enropean Football Associations (UEFA). Most
importantly, it has created a body ofjurisprudence for spolts disputes and coirtributed to the
harmonization and evolution of sport organizatious'sporting rules so they comply rvith basic
principles ofjustice, such as the right to be heard and the proportionaiity ofpunishnrent. This
has led to rhe fornlation of what is generally known as the /er sportiua, a compendiunr of trans-
national sporring rules for IFs and albitrational jurisprudence arising fi'om clecisions (known
as 'awards') rrade by the CAS over the years. Many sprorts clisputes euc{ up in fi'ont of the
CAS, whose decisions are generally accepted as final by the parties involved, especially iu cases
concerning the integrity of sports adndrlistrators (e.g. the CAS reduced from si-r yêars to four
)iears rhe suspension irnposed on UEFA's former presicient, Michei Platini, in the rvake of the
"FIFA scanclal" in 2015-2016).
Despite being rooted in the Olympic and world sport system, the CAS and the way it oper-
ates have 1ot always been u'e1l understood. In order to help remedy this situation, this chapter
pr-ovides an overvieu, of the CAS's governallce and suggests possibie ways of rmproving it'
The concept ofgovernance was constructed in the 1990s by scholars investigating the operat-
ing modes thât sectors combining public and plivate actions wer:e adopting in order to avoid
intr-usive resularion by public entities. the state, or the courts (e.g. I{ooûlan, 1993; Leftwich,
1994; Rhodes,1996) - what Rosenau and Czempiel (1,992) refened to as "Goveruance without
government".
T|is chapter is structurecl as foilows. First, we describe a practical, hierarchical niodel of
governance, that goes beyoncl the internal day-to-day rnâIlâgelnellt of organizations. Systemati-
ca1ly applying this rnodel to the CAS provicles a clear overvierv of the court governânce (rvhich
is done in the third section) and reveals a number of issues that cor"rld be explor-ecl in order to
igrprove this govemance. The fourth section desclibes these issues, which are put forward for
discussion within the CAS ancl beyond. The conclusion highlights the ûlportance of coutintt-
a1ly imprcving the CAS's governâ11ce and thereby ensuring the continued legitirnacy of "sports
.justice" in the eyes of all its stakeholclers.
A practical model of governance
In a fainous paper published in 1996, Rhodes arguecl that the word governance had too many
meanings (he listed slx) to be useful. Nevertheless, the tertl, if uot all its possible meanings, has
flourished to such an extent that it is 11ow part of the everyclay lexrcon. Governatlce first became
an inrpor-rant issue in the wor-icl of sport in L999, when the so-cailecl Salt Lake Ciry scand:rl
(Wê11, Barney ând Mal'tyl1, 2011) forcecl the IOC to refortl its strttctule aud introduce major
changes to the Olympic Charter. These refoi'ms inciuded nleasr-lres to iurplove the olsanizationk
govemance, such as setting an age limic for IOC ureurbers (70 years olcl), restricting presiclential
ternrs of office to a ma,rirlun o{ 12 years, introducing a Code of Et}rics to be overseen by atl
Ethics Comrrission, and settitlg up a nominations cot111nissioll (now knorvn as the Members
Election Comnrission) .In2009 the iOC adopted its "Basic lJniversal Principles of Good Gov-
ernânce of the Olympic ancl Sports Movement" (IOC, 2003), generaliy referr-ed to as the BuPs,
and used its Code of Etbics to rnake them obligatory rvithin the Olyrnpic nlovement. In2015'
followi1g scandals witbjn the IFs for football (FIFA) and atlrletics ([AAF), the IOC issued a dec-
laration on "good governânce in sport and the protection of clean athlet€s". It also welcomed
the decisiol by the Association of Summer Olympic International Feclerations (ASOIF) to Set
up a working group o11 the governance of sport in order to evaluate the govelnance of its lrrenr-
bers and help them improve it (lOC, 2015)-
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Figure 27. / The five questions associated with pérez,s five levels of governance
Source: Author adapted from pérez (2003)
Figure 27.2 Pérezt model applied to the IOC
Source.'Author
The governance of the CAS
Beyond Rhodes's and other âuthors'theoretical approaches, apnctrcd,approach to analyzing
governance is provided by Pérez's hierarchical model, wluch divides governance into five levelq
tom day+o-day management to the legal framework within which an organization operates
(Pêre2,2003). Although this model was conceived in relation ro rhe corporate world, it provides
an excellent template for exam:ining the structural governance of ,po.t and its organizations.
Pérez drew up his model to answer ûve fundamental questions about l' organization;s operating
rnode and srructures (Figre 27.1).
Frgtre 27.2 shows the ânswers to these questions in relation ro the IOC, following the
reforms introduced in 1,999 in the wake of rhe Salt Lake Ciry scandal (for more details", see
chappelet, 2012).lJnder the olympic charter (ru1e 61), 
"pp."l, 
againsr jecisions made by the
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IOC and its Executive Boarcl can be taken to the CAS, but only in "certain cases" (not speci{iecl).
However, the IOC explicitly designates the CAS as the sole body of appeal in the case of disputes
between the IOC ancl an Olyrnpic host city or its National Olympic Connrittee (NOC) (alticle
51.2HCC,20i6). What is nore, Olympic Games entry forrns and the byelaws to ruie 44 of
the Olympic Charter stipuiate that athletes and officials participating in the Olympic Games
must subnit "Olympic clisputes" to the CAS. All the IFs that recognize the CAS have included a
similar obligation for their corlpetitions, notably in the case of disciplinary sanctions. Neverthe-
less, the CAS has overturnecl or rnoclified numelous decisions made by sportk governing bodies.
For example, the CAS founcl against the IOC in a case brought by Canadian snowboarder Ross
Rebagliati in 1998, and it suspended the IAAF's rules on hyperandr-ogenism (athletes recoqnized
as female but who have natnrally high testosterone levels) follorving the Dutee Chand case in
2015, an issue not yet resolved in2Q28. Another exaraple is the CAS 2018 award cancelling the
IOCt doping bans ou 28 Russian athletes while upholding the bans against 11 other Russian
athletes a Gw days before the start of the PyeongChang Olympic-Winter Garles 201B (Perez-
Peiia ancl Panja, 2018).
In the case of the IOC, levels 1 to 3 of Pêrez's model are comprised almost entir-ely of struc*
tures and rules put in place by the IOC itself through its statlrtes, whereas leve1s 4 and 5 involve
external structules and require state irrtelvention in tire form of national and sorletimes interna-
tional laws. The IOC, like many other international sport oreanizations, most of which are asso*
ciations set up under articles 60-79 of the Swiss Civil Code, j.s sub.ject to Sw.iss law. Lr contrast,
the CAS wâs set up as an arbitration tribunal under chapter 12 of Switzerland's Feder:al Act on
Private International Law (LDIP in the French acrorryn: Loi Iédér'ale sur le droit international
giblie). Olympic sport organizations u'elcome such cooperâtion with governnlellts (and their
lartvs) and accepf the need to practice "good governance" (see, fol example, point 7 ofthe BIIP$
in exchange for maintaining their autononry: they call this attitude "responsible autononry" or,
in other words, a sport organization cleserves autonomy ifit does "good governance".
International law applicable to sport is still in its infancy. To date, it coversjust four areas, each
ofrvhich is the subject ofan international treary:
Spectator violence and misbehaviol (Council of Europe, 1985, 2016);
Corruption (noc only in sport) (UN, 2003);
Doping in Sport (UNESCO, 2005);
Manipulation of sports competitions (Council ofEurope. 2014).
The Council of Europei 2014 Convention on the Maliipulation of Sports Competitions and
2016 Convention on an Inteerated Safery Securiry and Service Approach at Football Matches
and Other Sports Events, which builds on the i985 Convention on Spectaror Violence and
Misbehavior; have now (in 2020) been ratified. The 2005 UNESCO Convention on Doping
in Sport and the 2003 UN Convention Against Corr:r-rption have also been ratified by marry
countries and therefore incorporated into their national legislation. Countries which rati$' the
Convention Against Corruption (public and private, passive or âctive) are r-equired to crimi-
na.lize corrupt pmctices, such as bribery, influence peddling, fraud, and money iaundering, if
these practices are not ah'eady criminal offenses under existing national 1aws. Other conventions
against corruption, such as tirose drawn up by the Council of Europe and the Olganization for
Econornic Cooperation and Development (OECD), may aiso apply to sport cases.
Moreover-, judicial authorities are increasingly using nationai laws to sanction misconduct
in sport. As noted previously, nlany sport orgarrizations are subjeçt to Swiss law, with the result
that some have felt the attentions of Switzerlandt civil and crininal prosecutors (FIFA a{fairs,
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see Chappeler,201,q. Flowever, such actions are not restrictecl to Switzerland. For example, in
2016 France's Financial Prosecutor's O{hce openecl an inquiry into a former IAAF President,
andBraziJtan prosecutors carried out investigations into allegations of ticket-touting by an IOC
member and corruption by the president and director general of the Rio 2006 organzing
committee (who all cleny the accusations). Sonre countries, notably Gerrnany, Austria, France,
Italy, and Kenya, have macle doping by athletes a criminal offense (tra{ïicking in perfortnance-
enhancing drugs is a crirninal offense in most countries).
Flowever, the most notable development has been the United Statesjustice systemt increased
willingness to police international sport. High-profile exarnples of this inciude the US Âttorney
General asking the Swiss authoritiesin20l.6 to arrest 12 FIFA members of its executice coln-
mittee for extradition to the United States, and an investigation by a New York district prosecu-
tor into doping at the 201,4 Winter Olympics in Sochi, Russia. Such actions are made possible
by US laws such as the Racketeer In{luenced and Corrupt Orgarization (RICO) Act and the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), wbich extend US.;urisdrction beyond the lJnited States'
geographical borders (Henning, 2016; Lipschutz,2009). The Rodchenkov Act discussed in the
US Congress in 2Q20 wor-rld crirninalize doping and give American prosecutors unprecedented
authority over global sport.
Pérez's model applied to the CAS
Applying Pérez's model to the CAS (see Figure 27 .3) provides a systematic overview of how the
tribunal functions (by level); it iclentiûes its weak points and highlights the role of the Interna-
tional Council of Arbitration for Sport (ICAS). It helps us understancl how the CAS complex
regime, mixing public and private law, functions.
Figure 27.j The five levels of governance within the CAS
Source; Author
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The analysis of each level wiil plovide us with suggestiorls (in the ne-xt secrior, on how ro
irnprove CAS ol further develop irs structure and organization.
Pérezt ûrst level (Who manages the organization day-to-day?) is cornposed of the CAS1
Court Office, which, following â ciirrent trend in justice-system managemenr research, can
be considered the CASI 'management' (Lienhard, Kettinger and Emery 2016).lt consists of a
perlllanent secretary generai, a depufy secr€tary general, a ûna.ncial dit'ector, 11 councilors (a11
lega1 experts), and secretaries. The councilors can be considered 'managers'because they ar.e
responsible for the day-to-day organization of the nurnerous procedures submitted to the CAS.
They arc supervised by the secretary general, who is a sort of chief executive oftcer (CEO).
In addition, the CAS has three divisions to which the different rypes of dispute it is asked to
arbitrate are assigned. As its nanre suggests, the Appeals Arbitration Division deals with appeals
against disciplinary sanctions handed down by spol-t organizâtions (once the organization's inter-
na1 appeals procedures have been exhausted). The Ordinary Arbitration Division hears aii the
other cases accepted by the CAS, except doping disputes. An Anti-Doping Division was added
in 201,9.
Neither division has pertnanent, salaried.arbitrators. Instead, they call upon arbitrators ûom
pre-established lists (see later discussion), as and when required. These arbitr-ators receive a fee of
CHF300 to 500 (in 2020) for each hour they work. There ale four rypes of dispute-resolution
procedure: appeal, ordinary, mediation, and ad hoc. (Ad hoc divisions ar€ set up on site during
major events, such as the Olympic Games, so any disputes that alise can be resolved quickly. A
separate acl hoc division to adjudicate cases of doping was set up for the trst time atthe20L6
Rio Olympics.) Disputes brought before the CAS are plocessed according ro â set of Procedural
Rules. Mediation cases are governed by a separate set of rules. The CAS registered almost 600
pr:ocedures tn2016, and has processed rnore than 5,000 procedures since its foundation (CAS,
2017). Most procedures are appeals (458 appeals procedures in2016) and are relared to cases
of doping. This is likely to continue given the IOC's desire to make rhe CAS the prirnary
adjudicator in all doping cases (through new Anti-Doping Division which starrecl operarions
in2019). The CASt non-binding rnediation service is rarely used, undoubtedly because it is
not obligatory to first go through a rnediation process (in contrast to the ailrirration procedur-e
introduced by Francek NOC, in which cases must trst go to mecliation). Ordinary procedur-es,
of whiclr there were 100 in2076, concern contractual and corrulercial relationships. The ad
hoc divisions at r.he 201.6 Rio Olyrnpics heard 41[ cases (CAS, 2017). More recenr srarisrics aïe
not publicly available.
As well as its headquarters in Lausanne, the CAS has decentralized offices in New York and
Sydney, and alternative hearing centres in Abu Dhabi, Kuala Lumpur, Cairo, and Shanghai.
As noted, teffiporary offices, including a speci{ic division for processing doping cases (since
Rio 2016), are set up for urajor competitions, most notably the Olympic Ganr.es (since Atianta
i996). The CASi website provides a schedule of ar-bitration costs, which consisr of a fixed Court
O{Ïice fee (currendy CHF1,000), an administration fee that varies according to the size of the
disputed sum (from CHF100 to CHF25,000), and the arbitrators'cosrs and fees. IJnder certain
circumstances, and on request fiom the parties, the ICAS may provide financial aid to cover part
ofthe parties'costs.
The second level of Pérez's model (-Who mânâges the managers?) consists of the ICAS Board,
whereas the third ievei ('Who manages the rnanagers'managers?) consists of the full ICAS (lnter-
national Councii ofArbitration for Sport). The ICAS was founded in Paris as a Swiss foundation
in 1994, the IOCt centenary year, by the IOC, the Association of National Olympic Comrnit-
tees (ANOC), and the urnbrella associations for the IFs of Summel anrl'Winter: Olympric spor:ts
(ASOIF and AIOWF). Together, these organizations provide about two-thirds of the ICASï
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(ancl, therefor-e, of the CAS's) furrdin g. In 201.6, the IoC, ANOC, ancl ASOIF/AIOV/F 
each
frorrla.a 21vo of the ICAS/CAS3 funding 
(Sternheirner, 2016); however, it should be remem-
ber-ed that the ANOC, ASOIE and AIOWF are mostly ûrncled by the loc' The IGAS obtains
the remairung rhird of its budget from the fees paicl by the parties 
whose cases are heard b1' the
CAS.
The ICAS was createcl in 1994, in response to r€marks :rbout the cAS's inclependence by
Switzerlancl's supreme court, the Tribunal Fécléral, in its ludgment on â case 
brought before it
by horse ricler Èlmar Gundel. Gundel hrd challenged CAS'S decision concerning 
his appeal
"g"i.rrt 
a doping sancrion imposed by the International Equestrian Federation (FEI), clairn-
ing rhat rhe CAS wâs not i.riep"ndent frorn sportk governing bodies' 
Although the Tribunal
re?a.l rqecred Gr-rndel's "pp.i, 
ruli'g that the CAS was i.depe'dent from the FEI, the judges
norecl that the IoC's .lor"lirrk, with the CAS might have prevented them reaching 
a fair deci-
sion if the case had involved the Ioc directly (Tribunal Fédéral 1'993) ' In fact, tt that time the
Ioc not only financed the cAS, it also provided its prenrises and appointed its arbitrators' The
Tribunal Fédéral's remark led the CAS! founders to cr€ate the ICAS, approving 
its statutes in
whac becarne known as the "Paris Agreement"- These statutes, which also cover 
the CAS' are
known as the "Code of Sports-Relat;d Arbitration" and have been updated 
regularly since they
{irsr carne inro force, in tsgq. A set of proceclural Rules, approved by the ICAS, supplements
che Cocle.
The ICAS Board j.s a subser of the ICAS, consisting of five of its 20 members: 
ICAS's presi-
clenr and two vice-presidenCs, plus the president of the ordinary Arbitration Division, 
antl the
presiclent of the Appeals Arbitration Division. The cAS's secretary general is also 
che Board's
secretary but is not a voring member of the Board. ICAS'S president, who is also 
the president
of rhe cAS, oversees rhe ap'plication of the code. The cAS provides the infrastructr-rre 
needed
ro resolve, by arbitration, tlr. ,po.ting disputes submitted to it. Heuce, the president frrlfills the
role of chairman (of the bo"rdi, distincr froor th. CEO (secretary general), quite rightly ftom a
governance point of view-
All 20 menrbers of the ICAS are appointed for renewable periods of four years as follows:
rhe Ioc appoints four members, th" olympic IFs appoint four menrbers (three for the ASOIF
and one for the AIowF), rhe ANOC appoints four members; these tust 12 members appoint
a further four members, ,, " 
*"y of "safeguarding the interests of the athletes" (article 54 of the
Code), and the first 16 members appoint ihe remaining four members from among 
personalities
independent of the IOC, ANOC, ASOIE and AIOS/F'
The ICAS has numerous atrributions (article s6 of the code), but many of these 
attributions
can be (and often are) delegated to the Board. Attributions that cannot be delegated 
include
revising the code (any r.visions to the code rnust be approved by at least wvo-thirds of the
ICAS'5 rnelrbers), electing ICASk presiclent and vice-presidents, and the presidents of 
the cAS's
clivisions, and approving tile CAS's budget and accounts, which are prepared by the Court 
office
and subrnitted to the Board. The ICAS meets at least once a year.
One of the ICAS'5 main responsibilities is to appoint general or football-specific 
arbitta-
tors and mediators. Potential arbitrators are nominated by the Board and are appointecl 
for
terms of four years, renewable without limit. The ICAS can also remove arbitrators frorn the
cAS',s lists. ln2020,the cASt lists (published on its website) included 393 generù arbitrators
from.rnore than 95 countries, 104 football arbitrators; and 58 mediators' For each 
procedure'
three ar-bitrators are chosen from these lists by the parties involved: one party chooses 
the first
arbitratof, the other pârty chooses a second arbrtrator, and the first two arbitrators choose
the president of the panel by mutual agreement. If mutual agreement is not reached within a
ser rime limjt, the presideni of the relevant division appoints the president of the panel' The
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president of the panel can be recused by the ICAS or must recuse himself/herself if legitinate
dotrbts could be raisecl about his/her independence (article 521 of the Code). The choice
of ar-birtrators by the parties is crucial. Following their appointment, arbitrators and rnedia-
tors must sign a declaration of impartiaiity and independence. As a furtherlneasLlre to avoid
âccusâtions of conflicts of interest, a neu' rule aclded to the Code excludes any person who is
actillg âs counsel for a party before the CAS tom serving as an arbitrator (alticle S18 of the
Code). Srmilariy, rlembers of the ICAS cannot be arbitrators (article 55). On the other hand,
some arbitrators âre selected much rnore t'equently than others and therefore have much
more information than other albiirators or poterltial parties. A systern of financial aid and
pro bono legal advice has been recently introduced. The appeals procedure is flee, with the
exception of a set fee of CHF1,000; however, the parties often incul substantial legal costs.
('WADA complained that the appeai by the cyclist Floyd Landis in 2007*20Q8 cost it nore
than €840,000.) Sometimes. upon its division presiclent, the CAS appoints a one-member'
only panel (instead ofthree).
The 1994 Paris Agreement (Reeb, 2004, p. 680 and sr.rbsequent) createcl the ICAS as a
foundation estabiished under Swiss law (articles 80-89a of the Swiss Civil Code). All important
foundations r-egistered in Switzerland are monitoled by the Federal Supervisory Authoriry for
Foundations, a public body within the Federal Department (ministry) of Home Affairs, which
checks that a foundation's assets are used for their declared purpose and that any moclifications
to its statutes (here the Code) comply with Swiss law. Hence, the Federal Supervisoty Author-
iry together with the Tribunal Fédéral, constitutes the fourth level in Pérezi moclel (.Where can
decisions be appealed?). This legal arrangement is subject to the Federal Act on Interuational
Private Law (LDIP), which governs arbitration in Switzerland. More specitcally, cases hcard
by rhe CAS are subject to "Chapter 12 Iirternational Arbitration" (alticles 176 to 194) of the
LDIP, unless both palties ar-e domiciled in Switzerland (such cases fall within the julisdiction of
Switzerlandt civil coults). The CAS's arvards can be appealed to the TribunalFêd&al, but only
in certain ciicurastances set down in the LDIP, nlost notably irregularities in the clesignation
of the arbitration panel, failure to respect procedures, or an award that is "inconpatible with
Swiss public policy". The CASt decisions are applicable in every country that has ratiûecl the
1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awalds
(over 125 countt'ies in2Q1.7, with the exceptioll of celtain African countries) and every spolt/
IF which has recognized CAS in jts statutes.
Some of the CASt awards have been appealed to the Ti'ibunal Fédérai by one of the parties.
The Gundel case led to the creation of the ICAS andrnajor leforms to the CASt statutes. In
2010, German speed skatel Claudia Pechstein fi1ed an appeal with the Tï-ibunal Fédér'al in which
she contested the CAS's independence Iiom the concelnecl IF The Tribunal Fédéral rejected
her appeai, and she took her case to the Gerrnan courts over abuse of dominant position by the
Ii where her arguments were eventually rejected by Germarry's Fedelal court despite an inittal
ruling in her favol by a Bavarian court. If Germanyi highest civil cour:t had found in Pechsteint
favor, this decision r,vould have called into question the entire edifice patiently constructed by
the CAS and the ICAS. A fur'ther appeal by the athlete to the European Court ofHuman fughts
in Strasbourg was dimissed in 2019 but recornmends public hearings. ln 2019, another appeal to
the German Constitutional Court is pending (Reinholz,2019).
Level 5 of Pérezs model (What legal fi'amewor-trrs?) conrprises all Swiss legislation relating
to what Pérez calls'meta5;overnance', including the previously mentioned 1987 Feclerai Act
on Private International Law (LDIP) and some international legislation such as the 1958 Ner'ry'
Yor* Convention (ratilied by Switzerland). However, the palties in a dispute may, by col1-rtilon
accold, choose to have their case heard under a law other than Swiss law, which is the default
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law for CAS arbitration procedures. Simr-la[ly, the patties may agi-ee to 
the case being heald in a
langr,rage other rhan one of rhe cASt rwo default languages, English and French' Furthermore,
if ril...,s no contractual clause obliging che palties to accept ar-bitration by the CAS' they may
submit their dispute to the civil courts in theil country of residence or to any 
other arbitr-ational
aurhoriry (including the cAS by later agreement). Flowever, all internacional sport 
federations
currenrl; obhge their arhletes to accept a.bitration by CAS when they sign cheir 
entry form for
a competltlon
In2019, the LDIP has been revised in order to maintain Switzerland as a major, attrac1ve
centre for arbitratiol. Several counlries, ilcluding Germany' Canacla, France, New Zealand' 
and
rhe united l(ngdom, have national courts of arbitration for sport that are not afliliated to the
CAS. (The CAS can also accept cases in which both parties are Swiss if they are not r-esident of
the same canton.) The obJigation for athletes to subrnit disputes to the CAS, inposed by 
many
IFs and sporrs conpetitioni has been juclgecl to be legally acceptable ancl not to be an abuse of
dreir donrinant position in the rnarket fiudgmenr in the Pechstein case)'
Al1 criminal lrr., "r" 
heard in the relevant national courts (as CAS only deals with civil cases) '
For example, FIFA's forrner presidenr Sepp Blatter will face criminal proceedings in Switzer-
1"nd o,r"r rll.garions of mirm"nag"ment and misappropriation of funds (articles 138 ald 158 of
swirzerland's criminal code). Revelations of corruption within FIFA had already led to Biatter
being banned by FIFA from all foorballing activities for eight yeârs, later reducecl to six 
years
lrpor:ting sancrion). Blattert appeai to the CAS was rejected 
but he clecicled not to take hus case
to the Tribunal Fédéral'
lssues to explore in order to improve the cAS governance
A strikireg feature of the {irst level of governance is the smal1 size of the CAS's day-to-day rnan-
agement;eam, as the Court Of{ice employs just 15 people, plus secretaries, to deal with more
rùan 600 procechres a year (in 2016). of course, arbitrators, once appointed, rlln their proce-
clures themselves, but the Court Oflice still has to supervise these procedures (most ofwLuch take
around six to 12 months) , organize hearings (which are held in Lausanne, unless the parties 
agree
other-wise), stightly copyeclit and publish certain awards, etc' Nevertheless, the Cor-rrt Office has
increased in size over the years, as when the CAS was founcled it had just one' part-time' sec-
retary general. The Court Of{rce currently occupies an entire tnansion in Lausanne (known as
rh" .ic-hât."r, de Béthusy"), but it is due to rrrove into larger prernises in the Palais de Beaulieu
(Lausanne's conference centre). Because the Court Oftce constitutes the entite ûrst 1evel of
Pérezt moclel (2003), its modest size could affect CAS's award deiays and qualiry as the Cor'rrt
Ofhce is clear-ly overburdened. Statistics on how long procedures take are needed in order to
determine to what extent this is the case'
The biggest hurdle to expanciing the Court Office would pr-obably be cost, but data on the
CAS's {inances is difficuit to obtain because the CAS does not publish an annual report, which
is clear-ly not a good example of transparency: a basic Gature of organizationai governance'
According ro tholoc Annual Report of 2015, the Ioc allocated us$7,931,000 to the ICAS'/
CASin2015andUS$8,275,000in201,4(IOC,2015, p. 170)'Giventhatthissumissupposedto
covet 21.Yoof the CAS's budget (Sternheimer, 2016), its total budget for 2016 can be estirnated
to have been appr-oximately US$38 miliion. All the CASI awards since 1986, except confidential
awards (mostly arising from ordinary procedules), have been added to a database consultable via
the CAS website. Publishing these awards has greatly increased the courti transparency, which
is one of rhc pillar-s of organizational governance (see, for example, the fourth pillar of the
Bt-IPs - Basic universal Prrnciples of Goocl Governance in the O]ympic and Sport Movement)'
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The CAS also publishes useful commentaries on cases and digests of awards (see, for exarnple,
Mavr-omati and Reeb, 2015).
ICAS's five-member Board plays a fundamental lole at level 2 because its five t.uembers draw
up draft decisions, which are then presented to the full ICAS for approval (level 3). The pr-esident
of the Appeals Arbitration Division has a particr-rlarly heavy wolkload, as this division processes
rnany of the CAS's procedures (this might change with the new Anti-Doping Division). It is
rhe division presiclent who chooses the president of each att'itlation panel (under article R54
of the Procedural Ru1es, each of the parties chooses one of the other arbitlators t'onr the CASt
list of arôitrator:s). Consequentiy, the division president can influence decisions through his/her
choice of arbirrâtors. Ln2020, the president of the Appeals Arbitration Division is Mrs. Corinne
Schlridhauser', an attorney and forrner ski racer, and the pr:esident of Anticloping Switzerland,
who rook over fi'on Thomas Bach in 2013, rvhen he was elected presiclent of the IOC. None
of the ICAST rnembers, inclucling the menrbers of the Board, receive a salary fi'onr the CAS,
but they probably receive solrre sort of rernuneration and, of course, the CAS covers their
expenses. Tl-re CASt remuneration policy is not rnade public, which questions its tlauspalerlcy
and accountabiliry
Level 3 consists of the 20 rnembers of the ICAS, nine of whom are woltlen irr2020 (atare
exapple of near gender parity). Two mernbers of the ICAS are also nretrrbers of the IOC,
ûrcluding its current plesident, Mr. John Coates fiom Austlalia, who was a vice-presiclent of the
IOC (201,3-2017). Although ICAS nrernbership has been receritiy reviewed, its tnernbers are
still often closely associated with organizations within the Olynpic moverrellt, and we do not
klow which founcling organization ploposed each ICAS membel. In addition to approving any
lrodificarions ro rhe Code (two-thirds majority required), the ICAST maitt roles are to appoint
rire CASI albitrators, the mernbers of its Board. andits secretary genei'al. The ICAS can also
recuse arbitlators when required. All appointments are fol four years, rvhich is short conrpared
rvith the usual rules about the inrmovability of judges. Flowever, iu contrast to many other
sport organizations, including the IOC. therc ale no limits on how often ternls can be reuerved
or o11 rhe age of appointees. Also r,rniike the IOC and FIFA, the CAS does not have au ethics
conrnission or rules about conflicts of interest rvhich ar.e now coruro1l in many spol't-related
organizations.
Although the bioglaphies of ar-bitrators on the CAS's rvebsite are very succinct, it can be seen
rhar mosr arbitrators have close liirks with the world of spolt, especially the IFs and NOCs. In
fact, until 2010 these organizations nominated all the CASt arbitrators. Of course, it is natural.
if not essential, for the CASI arbitratofs to be farniliar with the specitcities of sport. However,
rhe way in which arbitrators are appointed frequently raises questions about their independence
fronr sporr organizations (Vaitiekunas, 201.4;DuvaJ,,2015), even though this independence has
been recoglizecl by the supreme courts of both Switzerland and Germany (Gundel, Lazntitr.a,
and Pechsteil cases). The ICAS can take steps to nrinimize this type of criticism by lecusing an
ai-birraror fi'om a procedur-e (or even removing him,/her tam the CAS list) if that arbitlatolt
indepenclence is questioned, for example, by one of the palties in a dispute. Another issue relat-
ing to the choice of atbitrâtors is that many athletes feel they are unclerrepresented among the
ar-bitrators. Flowever, it is difficult to conceive of a system that would allorv athletes to nominate
ar-bitrarors with a thorough knowledge of both sport and (spolts) law. Organizecl leplesentation
for artiletes through 'unions'such as UNI 
.W'orld 
Athletes, EI-l Athletes, and FIFPRO, mar:ry of
which ate lno11o-sport, is yet to receive widespreaci recognition, especiaily Iiom sport organiza-
tions. The CAS recently began taking steps to increase the nunrber of athletes and wonten on
its lists of albirratol's by olgânizing free trailirrg senùttats Ibr, for exâll1ple, foltler athlctcs with
legal training.
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More generally, greater representation for stakeholders 
(athletes' spollsors' br-oadcasters'
sportseventorganizers,go"""'*tn*'etc')otherthanraditionalsportorganizationscouldhelp
improve the cAS,s go"..i.r-r... it *o.da b" us"f*l 
to have more detailecl information about the
arbitrarors available, "rp..irUy 
a iist ofthe cases each arbitrator has adjudicated 
(i* order to assess
theirexperierrce).Infact,manyarbitratorsneversitonanarbitradonpanelandarelistedmerely
,o d"*onrrr"re the CAS's geographical diveniry-
lJnder- cerrain .ir.rr*rirn.î, â.sc.ibed in the LDrp, appeals ry|":r- 
decisions made by the
cAS can be submirted to switzerlanclt supreme 
court, the Tf ibunal Fédéral (Pérezi levei 4) ' As
the gparantor of 'n" 
tot"tityf itgnl 
"*t*' 1 11fundecl 
by Swiss tax payers' lt is based in Laus-
:rnne, which facilitates .*rr^"r"i *iit ,t. cRs if necessary' Ali 
the Tribunal Féclér-al's ruli'gs'
including :rppeals "orr".ffi',h" 
cAS, are.published (wwwbger.ch/fr/juriscliction-recht)' 
A
private website run by t;;;;., frorri.l", nngûsh trrr,rl^tio,r, of opinions 
issuecl by the Trib*nal
.Fêclérarl in the fielct "ri","r""rià*al 
artirrattn (www.swissarbitr-ationdecisions'corn)' Although
the Tribnnal Fédéral ,"r";;;;;;;rt m"joriry (93%) of 'appeals against 
cAS awards (sternheimer'
2016),tthascanceleclseveralawardsfo,,p,o.".1.,'-,1,.,,on,(seeMavromatianclReeb,2015,
pp'562_600).Thenrosrrec.nraw",cl"",'""l"dbytheTribunalFédéralbecauseitwas..contrary
to pubiic policy,,followeJor1 "pp".r 
uy tïrazthanprofessional footballer called Matuzalem 
who
hadbeenbanneclftollp|lying/workingforaSpanishclubbecausehewastrnable/unwillingto
payhisforrnerempioyef,t'"etznri]lionincorrrpensationsetbyFIFA(TribtinalFêd&al.2012).
Matuzalenr had taken his "*r. 
to the Tribunal Fécléral after his initial appeal to the 
cAS had
t"ïni:fframework 
governing the cAS,s operarions is ser by. swily 
raw (reve1 5 o{pêrez's
modei). Some p"*r., (*Jrtr rirrr."o have filed appeals with state 
jurisclictions (Gerrnan coluts,
European Corrrt of Htt*"" fug1"" éo.t't of;t"tit" of the Europe"tt y-Ïo")' 
following unsuc-
cessful arbitration procedures- In addition, some 
countries have set up national collrts of arbitra-
tion for sport 1C".rrnÇ è"nacla, France, New Zealand, 
and united Kingdom), thereby crearing
the risk chat the jurisp,,oj;; .mrnating from these courrs will differ 
frorn the jurisprudence
pr.ocluced by the cAS. such an eventualicy woulcl 
irnperil the harmonization of the jurispru-
àence clevelopecl by the CAS over the years'
Conclusion
ThischapterproviclesabriefoverviewoftheCAs,sgovernanceandsllggestsanumberofways
of irnproving it, taking into account the main pt=ttp" of moclern 
governance' *n":ttltti:î
parency, independence, ancl the representation- of stakehoiders' 
stakehoider represelltatlon' ln
terms of rhe choi.. of "rbirrators, 
is an especialy importanr issue,for thi c,as'
Given the current 'p;;;;;; 
t ryar,,zarronal'goi'"'o"ot" - the period 2000-2013 
saw the
publication of more -#iil;; oi"prin.ipt", oi good governance. in.sport 
(chappelet ancl
Mrkonjic, 201"3) -rhe cAS rrusr ensure it, gorr"ràn.e 
is irr-eproachable and set its sights on
achieving ever better go"""t"tt", rather thanjust "good governance"- 
Addressing the isstles set
otlr in rhis chaprer ", 
,oorr^", porribl. *o,rla help th". cAi achieve this and thereby maintain 
its
iegitimacy in the eyes of all its stakehoiclers'
The governance of the CAS
References
CAS. (2017). Stdtistiques_ Sttxtkrirs. Available at: www-tas-cas,orgl61eadmin/user-upload/CAS-statistics}o\6-.
pdf.
Chappelet, J-L. (201'0) ' IJ atttononie du sport 
en Europe' Strasl'ruurg: Council of Europe'
?19
h
'it
'tê
jt**
{
i
Jean-Loup Chappelet
Chappelet, J-L. (2012). Frorn daily managelnent to high politics: The governance of the Inrernâtio1al
Olympic Comnrittee. In: L. Robinson et al., eds., Th.e handbook of intemational sltort martulgeuÊn.t. London:
Routledge, pp.7-25.
Chappelet, J-L. (2016). Jeux OQtLpiques: rauiuer laJlamne. Lausanne: PPtlR, chapter 3.
Chappelet, J-L. and Mrkonjic, M. (2013). The basic indicators for better govenrance in intern.ational sytort
(BIBGIS). Lausanne: IDHEAP Working Papers.
Council of Europe. (1"985). Euroltean conuention. on spectator uiolen.ce and misbehauiour at sports euetfts and i1
partialar atfootball matches, Aug. Strasbourg: Council ofEurope.
Council of Europe. (2074). Cotuention on the manipulation. of sports competitiotts, Sept. Macolin: Council of
Europe.
Council ofEurope. (201'6). European conrention. on integratecl safety, seatrity and seruice approach. atfootball
natches an.d other sports euents, 21B,JuIy. Saint-Denis, France: Council ofEurope.
Duva1, A. (2015). The cottrt oJ arbitrationJor sport aftet Peclxstein.: Reform or reuolutiou? Asser International Sports
Law Blog.
Federal Court. (1993).Judgrnent of the Federal Court of 15 Mas. Qfficial Cotteaion of Federal CourtJudg-
nents, 11,9 1I271.
HCC. (2016). Host city contract, principles, games of the XXXW O\mpiad - Candidature process 2024.
Henrung, PJ. Q016). Road map for pursuit of soccer charges. In.terndtional Netu York Times, p. 14.
IOC. (2008). Basic un.irtersal principles of good goueftld.nce of the Olynpic and sçtorts 4xouement. Lausamre: IOC.
IOC. (2015). OC Executive Board adopts declaration on good gouem.ance in sport and tlte protection. of.clean athletes.
Lausanne: IOC. Press release, Dec. 10.
Kooinran,J., ed. (1993). Modern. gouernance: Neu gotemment - Socie\, interactiotls. London: Sage.
Leftwich, A. (1994). Governance, the state and the politics of developrnent. Deuelopflxent antl Change,25(2).
Lienhad, A., Kettinger', D. and Emery, Y. (2016). 'What managernent merhods for justice? Iz Tërnps.
Lipschutz, R.D. (2009). Tlte constitt.ttiott of inperiun. London: Paradigm.
Mavrorrati, D. and Reeb, M. (2015). The code of tlæ court of arbitration.for sport: Commentary, cases and materials.
The Hague: Iduwer Law International.
Pérez-Peiia, R. (2003). C o rp o rate gouent an ce. Paris'. Discovery.
Perez-Peia, R. and Panja, T. (2018). 28 Russian athletes win appeals of doping bans. The Netu York Tittes.
Reeb, M., ed. (200a). Digest of CAS awards III 2001*2003. The Hague: Kluwer Law Internarional.
Reinholz, F. (2019). Latest developments in the Pechstein case. 15 March. 1SL4 uebsite. Avatlable ar: w-ww.
isiasportlawyer.com/latest-developments-pechstein-case-ruling-european-court-hunan-rights,/.
Rlrodes, R.A.W: (1996). The new governance: Governing without governmenr. Potiticdt Studies, 44(4).
Rosenau, J.N. and Czernpiel, E-O., eds- (1,992). Gouetn.an.ce witlrcut goverwnent: Order and change in world
politirs. Carnbridge: Cambridge university Press.
Sternheimer, \M (2016). Introduction to the Court oJArbitration.Jot Sport (CAS) antl its procedures, presentariol?
in Ceneva.
I1 ibunal Fédéral. (201,2). Francelino da Sifua Manrzalem/FIFA: Statutory punishmen.t coil.trdty to public order.
UN. (2003). Conuention against corruptior, Oct. New Yor-k: United Nations Organization.
UNESCO. (2005). International conuention against doping itt sport, Oct. Paris: IJnited Nations Education,
Science and Culture Organization.
Vaitiekunas, A. (2014). The court of arbitation for sport: I-au,-making and the questiott of independence. Betn
Stânçfli.
Wenn, S., Barney, R. and Martyn, S. (2011). Tamished rings: The International Olympic Committee anri the Sal.t
I-^tke City ltid scandal. Syracuse: Syracuse lJniversity Press.
320
Routledge Handbook
of the Olympic and
Paralympic Games
Edited by Dikaia Chatziefstathiou, Editor-in-Chief,
and Borja Garcîa and Benoit Séguin
Ê) Routledoe
$ \ raytor a. rran.iicroup
LONDON AND NEWYORK
